The current coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak vividly demonstrates the burden that
respiratory infectious diseases impose in an intimately connected world.
Unprecedented containment and mitigation policies have been implemented
in an effort to limit the spread of COVID-19, including travel
restrictions, screening and testing of travelers, isolation and
quarantine, and school closures.
A key goal of such policies is to decrease the
encounters between infected individuals and susceptible individuals and
decelerate the rate of transmission. Although such social distancing
strategies are critical in the current time of pandemic, it may seem
surprising that the current understanding of the routes of host-to-host
transmission in respiratory infectious diseases are predicated on a
model of disease transmission developed in the 1930s that, by modern
standards, seems overly simplified. Implementing public health
recommendations based on these older models may limit the effectiveness
of the proposed interventions.
Understanding Respiratory Infectious Disease Transmission
In 1897, Carl Flügge showed that pathogens were present
in expiratory droplets large enough to settle around an infected
individual. “Droplet transmission” by contact with the ejected and
infected fluid phase of droplets was thought to be the primary route for
respiratory transmission of diseases. This view prevailed until William
F. Wells focused on tuberculosis transmission in the 1930s and
dichotomized respiratory droplet emissions into “large” and “small”
droplets.
According to Wells, isolated droplets are emitted upon
exhalation. Large droplets settle faster than they evaporate,
contaminating the immediate vicinity of the infected individual. In
contrast, small droplets evaporate faster than they settle. In this
model, as small droplets transition from the warm and moist conditions
of the respiratory system to the colder and drier outside environment,
they evaporate and form residual particulates made of the dried material
from the original droplets. These residual particulates are referred to
as droplet nuclei or aerosols. These ideas resulted in a
dichotomous classification between large vs small droplets, or droplets
vs aerosol, which can then mediate transmission of respiratory disease.
Infection control strategies were then developed based on whether a
respiratory infectious disease is primarily transmitted via the large or
the small droplet route.
The dichotomy of large vs small droplets remains at the
core of the classification systems of routes of respiratory disease
transmission adopted by the World Health Organization and other
agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. These
classification systems employ various arbitrary droplet diameter
cutoffs, from 5 to 10 μm, to categorize host-to-host transmission as
droplets or aerosol routes.1
Such dichotomies continue to underly current risk management, major
recommendations, and allocation of resources for response management
associated with infection control, including for COVID-19. Even when
maximum containment policies were enforced, the rapid international
spread of COVID-19 suggests that using arbitrary droplet size cutoffs
may not accurately reflect what actually occurs with respiratory
emissions, possibly contributing to the ineffectiveness of some
procedures used to limit the spread of respiratory disease.
New Model for Respiratory Emissions
Recent work has demonstrated that exhalations, sneezes,
and coughs not only consist of mucosalivary droplets following
short-range semiballistic emission trajectories but, importantly, are
primarily made of a multiphase turbulent gas (a puff) cloud that
entrains ambient air and traps and carries within it clusters of
droplets with a continuum of droplet sizes (Figure; Video).2,3
The locally moist and warm atmosphere within the turbulent gas cloud
allows the contained droplets to evade evaporation for much longer than
occurs with isolated droplets. Under these conditions, the lifetime of a
droplet could be considerably extended by a factor of up to 1000, from a
fraction of a second to minutes.
Owing to the forward momentum of the cloud,
pathogen-bearing droplets are propelled much farther than if they were
emitted in isolation without a turbulent puff cloud trapping and
carrying them forward. Given various combinations of an individual
patient’s physiology and environmental conditions, such as humidity and
temperature, the gas cloud and its payload of pathogen-bearing droplets
of all sizes can travel 23 to 27 feet (7-8 m).3,4
Importantly, the range of all droplets, large and small, is extended
through their interaction with and trapping within the turbulent gas
cloud, compared with the commonly accepted dichotomized droplet model
that does not account for the possibility of a hot and moist gas cloud.
Moreover, throughout the trajectory, droplets of all sizes settle out or
evaporate at rates that depend not only on their size, but also on the
degree of turbulence and speed of the gas cloud, coupled with the
properties of the ambient environment (temperature, humidity, and
airflow).
Droplets that settle along the trajectory can
contaminate surfaces, while the rest remain trapped and clustered in the
moving cloud. Eventually the cloud and its droplet payload lose
momentum and coherence, and the remaining droplets within the cloud
evaporate, producing residues or droplet nuclei that may stay suspended
in the air for hours, following airflow patterns imposed by ventilation
or climate-control systems. The evaporation of pathogen-laden droplets
in complex biological fluids is poorly understood. The degree and rate
of evaporation depend strongly on ambient temperature and humidity
conditions, but also on the inner dynamics of the turbulent puff cloud
coupled with the composition of the liquid exhaled by the patient.
A 2020 report from China demonstrated that severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) virus particles could be
found in the ventilation systems in hospital rooms of patients with
COVID-19.5
Finding virus particles in these systems is more consistent with the
turbulent gas cloud hypothesis of disease transmission than the
dichotomous model because it explains how viable virus particles can
travel long distances from patients. Whether these data have clinical
implications with respect to COVID-19 is unknown.
Implications for Prevention and Precaution
Although no studies have directly evaluated the
biophysics of droplets and gas cloud formation for patients infected
with the SARS-CoV-2 virus, several properties of the exhaled gas cloud
and respiratory transmission may apply to this pathogen. If so, this
possibility may influence current recommendations intended to minimize
the risk for disease transmission. In the latest World Health
Organization recommendations for COVID-19, health care personnel and
other staff are advised to maintain a 3-foot (1-m)6
distance away from a person showing symptoms of disease, such as
coughing and sneezing. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
recommends a 6-foot (2-m) separation.7,8
However, these distances are based on estimates of range that have not
considered the possible presence of a high-momentum cloud carrying the
droplets long distances. Given the turbulent puff cloud dynamic model,
recommendations for separations of 3 to 6 feet (1-2 m) may underestimate
the distance, timescale, and persistence over which the cloud and its
pathogenic payload travel, thus generating an underappreciated potential
exposure range for a health care worker. For these and other reasons,
wearing of appropriate personal protection equipment is vitally
important for health care workers caring for patients who may be
infected, even if they are farther than 6 feet away from a patient.
Turbulent gas cloud dynamics should influence the design
and recommended use of surgical and other masks. These masks can be
used both for source control (ie, reducing spread from an infected
person) and for protection of the wearer (ie, preventing spread to an
unaffected person). The protective efficacy of N95 masks depends on
their ability to filter incoming air from aerosolized droplet nuclei.
However, these masks are only designed for a certain range of
environmental and local conditions and a limited duration of usage.9
Mask efficacy as source control depends on the ability of the mask to
trap or alter the high-momentum gas cloud emission with its pathogenic
payload. Peak exhalation speeds can reach up to 33 to 100 feet per
second (10-30 m/s), creating a cloud that can span approximately 23 to
27 feet (7-8 m). Protective and source control masks, as well as other
protective equipment, should have the ability to repeatedly withstand
the kind of high-momentum multiphase turbulent gas cloud that may be
ejected during a sneeze or a cough and the exposure from them. Currently
used surgical and N95 masks are not tested for these potential
characteristics of respiratory emissions.
There is a need to understand the biophysics of
host-to-host respiratory disease transmission accounting for in-host
physiology, pathogenesis, and epidemiological spread of disease. The
rapid spread of COVID-19 highlights the need to better understand the
dynamics of respiratory disease transmission by better characterizing
transmission routes, the role of patient physiology in shaping them, and
best approaches for source control to potentially improve protection of
front-line workers and prevent disease from spreading to the most
vulnerable members of the population.
Corresponding Author: Lydia Bourouiba, PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139 (lbouro@mit.edu).
Published Online: March 26, 2020. doi:10.1001/jama.2020.4756
Conflict of Interest Disclosures: None reported.
Funding/Support:
Dr Bourouiba reported receiving research support from the Smith Family
Foundation, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Policy Lab,
the MIT Reed Fund, and the Esther and Harold E. Edgerton Career
Development chair at MIT.
Role of the Funder/Sponsor:
The funders had no role in the preparation, review or approval of the
manuscript and decision to submit the manuscript for publication.
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